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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs in the presence
of coordination frictions. Firms offer human-capital-contingent wages, workers observe these and apply
for a job. In a symmetric equilibrium, identical workers use identical mixed strategies in deciding where
to apply, and the randomness introduced by mixed strategies generates equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies. The equilibrium can be interpreted as the competitive equilibrium of a closely related model,
ensuring constrained efficiency. The model generates a rich interaction between the heterogeneous
workers and firms. Firms attract applications from multiple types of workers, and earn higher profits
when they hire a more productive worker. Identical workers apply for jobs with different productivity and
get higher wages when they land a more productive job. Despite this mismatch, I show that in some
special cases, the model generates assortative matching, with a positive correlation between matched







How does the labor market assign workers to jobs? Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and
Shapley and Shubik (1972) ﬁrst explored this question, proving that the core allocation
of an assignment game is equivalent to an appropriately deﬁned competitive equilibrium.1
This model yields a number of very powerful predictions. Identical workers should earn the
same wage, even if they take diﬀerent types of jobs. Identical ﬁrms should earn the same
proﬁts, even if they hire diﬀerent types of workers. If workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics are
complements in production, a more productive worker should always have a better job than
a less productive one (Becker 1973). Unemployment and vacant jobs cannot coexist. If there
is unemployment, only the least productive workers will be unemployed, while if there are
vacancies, only the least productive ﬁrms will fail to hire a worker.
These predictions are inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. For example, con-
sider a panel data regression of wages on an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, any time varying worker
characteristics, and on some measure of the quality of the worker’s job. The individual
ﬁxed eﬀect should soak up any observable or unobservable time-invariant individual char-
acteristics, and so the textbook assignment model predicts that the quality of the worker’s
job should not aﬀect her wage. On the contrary, the data indicates that workers in bet-
ter quality jobs consistently earn higher wages (Krueger and Summers 1988, Gibbons and
Katz 1992, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). Similarly, ﬁrms’ proﬁts appear to depend
on the quality of their employees. The other stark predictions fail as well. Although on
average more productive workers have better jobs than less productive ones, that is not true
on a case-by-case basis. Unemployment and vacancies coexist, high productivity workers are
sometimes unemployed, and high productivity jobs sometimes go unﬁlled.
This paper asks how large a departure one requires from the textbook assignment model
in order to explain these facts. The short answer is ‘not much’. I consider an economy
consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral workers, each characterized by one of N diﬀerent
human capital levels, and a continuum of risk-neutral ﬁrms with heterogeneous levels of
physical capital described by an arbitrary distribution. Each ﬁrm has a single vacancy
to ﬁll, and towards that end, ﬁrms simultaneously commit to wages that they will pay a
worker as a function of her human capital. Workers observe all the wage oﬀers and each
simultaneously applies for one job. Firms that receive at least one application select one
1Sattinger (1993) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide comprehensive reviews of the literature on
matching with transferable and non-transferable utility, respectively.
1worker, pay her the promised wage, and produce. Workers whose application is rejected are
unemployed and do not get paid, while jobs that fail to hire a worker remain vacant and do
not produce.
The core allocation is one equilibrium of this model. All ﬁrms oﬀer workers the compet-
itive wage, and workers apply for diﬀerent jobs, with the same assignment as in the core.
While it is consistent with the rules of the game, this equilibrium relies very heavily on
everybody knowing exactly what everyone else is doing. In particular, two workers with
the same human capital must know which of them is supposed to apply for which job. To
capture the notion that this level of coordination may be infeasible in a large economy, I
introduce a symmetry restriction on strategies: in equilibrium, identical workers must use
identical application strategies. If workers used pure strategies, a positive mass of workers
would apply for each of N diﬀerent jobs, while every other job would go unﬁlled. This
cannot be an equilibrium, and so instead workers use mixed strategies in deciding where to
apply for a job. Workers’ independent mixing implies that some jobs attract more than one
applicant while other identical jobs attract none, generating equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies.
Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) have explored a
similar environment, although all of these papers assume workers are homogeneous, thus pre-
cluding a study of the assignment issues that are central to this paper. I extend those earlier
works to an environment with heterogeneous workers and jobs and an arbitrary production
function. Section 4 focuses on how a single ﬁrm sets its wage schedule, taking as given the
actions of the other ﬁrms and the response of workers to changes in its wage schedule. I
show that the ﬁrm’s expected revenue is a concave function of the expected number of appli-
cations it receives from each type of worker, while its cost is linear in these variables. This
insight yields a useful alternative representation of the ﬁrm’s problem. The ﬁrm eﬀectively
chooses the expected number of each type of applicant in order to maximize its expected
proﬁts, setting the expected marginal product of an application equal to the marginal cost.
Using the solution to this alternative problem, I then back out the ﬁrm’s underlying wage
schedule. The ﬁrm oﬀers a worker a wage equal to the output she produces in excess of the
expected output that the next best applicant would have produced. This ensures that the
ﬁrm earns higher proﬁts when it hires a more productive worker, and so it always hires the
most productive applicant for the job.
Section 5 places the ﬁrm into an equilibrium environment. I show that there exists a
unique equilibrium that satisﬁes the symmetry restriction on workers’ strategies. Moreover,
2the equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient: a social planner who wants to maximize output in
the economy but must satisfy the symmetry restriction would choose the same allocation as
the decentralized economy. This facilitates my interpretation of some of the results.
Although it is feasible for diﬀerent types of workers always to apply for diﬀerent jobs, this
does not happen in equilibrium. I prove that if there are at least two types of workers and the
distribution of ﬁrm characteristics has convex support, there is a positive measure of ﬁrms
that get applications from at least two types of workers. Firms gather applications from bad
workers as insurance against the event that no good workers apply for the job. Thus the
model generates equilibrium ‘mismatch’: there are workers with human capital h1 6= h2 and
jobs with physical capital k1 6= k2, and there is a positive probability that each type of ﬁrm
hires either type of worker. This makes it possible to ask whether a worker’s wage depends
only on her human capital, as in the textbook assignment model. On the contrary, I prove
that if human and physical capital are complements in production, wages are increasing in
physical capital after conditioning on human capital. This is oﬀset by greater competition
for jobs with more physical capital, creating more unemployment risk and leaving workers
willing to apply for a range of diﬀerent types of jobs. Similarly, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is increasing
in the human capital of its employee.
Section 6 analyzes an illustrative special case, the Cobb-Douglas production function, in
depth. A worker with human capital h is equally likely to apply for any job with physical
capital k above a threshold K(h), increasing in the worker’s human capital. This implies that
‘mismatch’ is widespread, with even the most productive ﬁrm hiring an arbitrarily unpro-
ductive worker with positive probability. Despite the mismatch, more productive workers on
average obtain more productive jobs. Similarly, on average more productive ﬁrms hire more
productive workers. Thus a weaker notion of assortative matching holds in this environment.
With this functional form, I also prove that more productive workers are unemployed less
frequently. Although ﬁrms hire more productive workers whenever possible, this result is
not immediate, since more productive workers also apply for better jobs on average. Fi-
nally, I perform two simple comparative statics exercises, showing that an increase in the
human capital distribution reduces the employment rate and expected income of a worker
conditional on her human capital, while an increase in the physical capital distribution has
the opposite eﬀect. The tractability of the Cobb-Douglas case suggests the possibility of a
number of extensions to the model, for example to a dynamic framework, to an economy in
which workers can apply for multiple jobs within a period, or to an economy with endogenous
human and physical capital formation.
3Section 7 considers another special case, an economy with just two types of workers. I
prove that if the production function is log supermodular in human and physical capital, a
weaker version of positively assortative matching obtains. This generalizes the results from
the Cobb-Douglas case, since that production function is weakly log supermodular. Strictly
log supermodular production functions have stronger complementarity between human and
physical capital. I also prove that with an additively separable production function, which
is weakly supermodular but strictly log submodular, matching patterns are described by
a weak version of negative sorting. Unlike in a frictionless environment (Becker 1973),
supermodularity alone does not imply positively assortative matching.
Section 2 brieﬂy describes the related literature. Section 3 lays out the model, Section 4
describes the solution to a single ﬁrm’s problem, and Section 5 imbeds the ﬁrm’s problem
in an equilibrium framework and derives a number of general results. Section 6 analyzes the
model with a Cobb-Douglas production function in detail, providing closed form solutions for
the equilibrium and showing that there is a weak version of positively assortative matching
in equilibrium. Section 7 examines assortative matching in an economy with two types of
workers. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Montgomery (1991) and Peters (1991) explore the implications of symmetry restrictions
in wage or price posting games similar to the one analyzed here. Burdett, Shi, and Wright
(2001) reﬁne these analyses, showing that the equilibrium of an economy with a ﬁnite number
of buyers and sellers converges to the equilibrium of an economy with inﬁnitely many buyers
and sellers. They also extend the earlier papers by allowing ﬁrms to create more than one
vacancy, a possibility that I do not admit.
Three recent papers have extended the wage posting framework to environments with
heterogeneous workers and jobs. Coles and Eeckhout (2000) look at an economy with two
heterogeneous workers and two heterogeneous jobs, and with complements in production.
One of their main results is that the anonymity restriction has no bite in this environment.
There is a sense in which this ﬁnding is not very surprising, since anonymity only imposes
that identical workers must be treated identically, an empty restriction when there are no
identical workers. Still, the basic message of Coles and Eeckhout (2000) carries over to my
economy: there must be identical workers in order to generate coordination frictions and
mismatch. This raises an important question: do identical workers really exist? Even if
4no two workers are truly identical, it seems reasonable to assume that the millionth most
productive worker in the United States economy does not know that she is exactly the
millionth most productive worker, and similarly she does not know which is the millionth
most productive job. This informational problem will also hinder the coordination of workers’
application strategies, raising very similar issues to the ones in this paper.
Shi (2001a) looks at a similar economy to the one in this paper, but implicitly assumes
that before search begins, each ﬁrm must commit to hire a particular type of worker. Thus
ﬁrms cannot use applications from bad workers as insurance against not getting an applica-
tion from a good worker. Although it is still possible that identical ﬁrms choose to gather
applications from diﬀerent types of workers, Shi proves that this does not happen in equi-
librium. My analysis gives ﬁrms the option of committing to hire only one type of worker,
for example by oﬀering other types a zero wage, but I prove that in general they choose not
to exercise that option. Since in equilibrium ﬁrms attract applications from diﬀerent types
of workers, my model generates endogenous mismatch, diﬀerential unemployment rates for
diﬀerent workers applying for the same type of job, and a correlation between ﬁrm proﬁts
and worker productivity after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics. None of those results make
sense in Shi’s equilibrium.
Shi (2001b) does not impose the commitment restriction, making the model fairly similar
to the one in this paper. The main technical diﬀerence between that paper and this one is
that Shi analyzes a model with two types of workers and ﬁrms and a Leontief production
function, while I consider an arbitrary number of worker types, a continuum of ﬁrms, and
a much broader class of production functions. Some of Shi’s results are similar to those
in this paper. For example, under some parameter restrictions, there is mismatch, with
less skilled workers applying for both types of jobs with positive probability. In addition,
Shi endogenizes ﬁrms’ entry decisions and considers a number of comparative statics results
related to skill-biased technical change that go beyond the scope of this paper. But, Shi does
not establish many of the Propositions in Section 5, even within his environment; he does
not provide the strong characterization of the equilibrium with a Cobb-Douglas production
function in Section 6, since he restricts attention to a Leontief technology; and likewise his
characterization of the equilibrium with two types of workers is a special case of my analysis
in Section 7.
This paper is also related to random search models with heterogeneous agents (Sattinger
1995, Lu and McAfee 1996, Burdett and Coles 1999, Shimer and Smith 2000). These papers
assume workers have no information about jobs and so must randomly look for them. There
5are several advantages to the present model over the random search framework. First,
in the random search framework, wage setting is determined outside the model, typically
through a Nash bargaining solution. Equilibrium matching patterns depend on the exact
speciﬁcation of the bargaining game, for example the threat points while bargaining. There
is no theoretical reason to prefer one speciﬁcation of the bargaining game over another.
Second, the random search framework assumes there is mismatch. With a continuum of job
productivity levels, it would take inﬁnitely long for a worker to ﬁnd a particular type of job,
and so necessarily optimizing agents must compromise on their matching pattern. That is
not the case in this paper. Indeed, with a Leontief production function, where output is the
minimum of the job’s physical capital and the worker’s human capital, and with identical
distributions of workers and jobs in the economy, a worker with human capital h applies
only for jobs with physical capital k = h, so there is no mismatch. With other production
functions, mismatch is a consequence of workers’ decision to look for a range of possible jobs,
something they could choose not to do.
Third, in the random search model, low productivity workers impose a congestion exter-
nality on the search process, making it harder for jobs to meet high productivity workers.
This generates ineﬃciencies in a decentralized search equilibrium (Shimer and Smith 2001a)
and may imply that limit cycles, in which some types of matches are repeatedly created and
then destroyed, are more eﬃcient than steady state equilibria (Shimer and Smith 2001b). In
the assignment model with coordination frictions, jobs can (and do) choose not to hire bad
workers when good ones are available, eliminating the congestion externality. The decen-
tralized equilibrium is unique and eﬃcient, and even in dynamic extensions to the model,
there is nothing to be gained by pursuing nonstationary policies. Finally, the random search
framework is not very tractable, while this paper demonstrates the possibility of performing
some simple cross-sectional comparisons and comparative statics in the assignment model
with coordination frictions. At a minimum, the assignment model with coordination frictions
provides a useful alternative representation of the job search process.
3 Model
3.1 Participants
There are two types of risk-neutral agents in the market, workers and ﬁrms. There is a
measure 1 of workers distinguished by N diﬀerent human capital levels 0 ≤ h1 < ··· < hN ≤
6¯ h. Let ψn denote the measure of type hn workers in the economy. There is also a measure θ of
ﬁrms, each of which is trying to ﬁll a single job. Firms’ physical capital k is distributed with
a generalized probability distribution Φ on a subset of [0,¯ k]. Let j, distributed uniformly
on [0,θ], uniquely identify an individual ﬁrm and kj denote its physical capital level. Where
there is no ambiguity, I sometimes refer to h and k as the worker’s and ﬁrm’s productivity
or type.
3.2 Production
Workers and ﬁrms can match in pairs. Deﬁne f : [0,¯ h] × [0,¯ k] 7→ R+, the output that a
worker with h units of human capital and a job with k units of physical capital produce as a
function of their types, f(h,k). An unmatched agent produces nothing. More generally, one
can view f(h,k) as the output produced by a type h worker and type k ﬁrm in excess of what
they would get while single. For this reason, I assume throughout that f is nonnegative.
I also impose that it is increasing in each argument, and hence strictly positive for k > 0.
I sometimes focus on the case where it is strictly supermodular, that is, for all h < h0
and k < k0, f(h,k) + f(h0,k0) > f(h,k0) + f(h0,k), or weakly log supermodular, that is,
f(h,k)f(h0,k0) ≥ f(h,k0)f(h0,k). Finally, it will be notationally convenient to introduce a
dummy type h0 with f(h0,k) = 0 for all k; this represents what the job produces if it fails
to hire any worker.
3.3 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
I represent the assignment problem as a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm j
commits to a wage that it will pay a worker if it hires her as a function of her human capital,
w(hn,j). In the second stage, each worker observes all the wage oﬀers and applies for one
job, in general using a mixed strategy. In the third stage, ﬁrms that receive at least one
application hire the most proﬁtable applicant, pay the promised wage, and produce.
In principle, the most productive applicant need not be the most proﬁtable one, the
one with the largest diﬀerence between output f(hn,kj) and the promised wage w(hn,j).
I introduce a ranking function R to summarize how ﬁrm j chooses between competing
applicants, essentially a notion of strict preference. Thus R(hn,hm,j) = 1 indicates that ﬁrm
j always hires a type hn applicant in preference to a type hm applicant. As is standard with
strict preferences, I assume R is asymmetric, so R(hn,hm,j) = 1 implies R(hm,hn,j) = 0.
Conversely, I assume that if m 6= n, R(hn,hm,j) = 0 implies R(hm,hn,j) = 1. I also
7assume that R is transitive, so that if R(hn,hm,j) = R(hm,hl,j) = 1, R(hn,hl,j) = 1 as
well. Finally, R encompasses the notion that ﬁrms strictly prefer to hire more proﬁtable
applicants, so that if f(hn,kj) − w(hn,j) > f(hm,kj) − w(hm,j), R(hn,hm,j) = 1. Note
that if hm and hn yield the same proﬁt to ﬁrm j, I assume j still strictly ranks the applicants,
although any ranking is permissible. This aﬀords a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation of the notation
at little loss of generality. In particular, it is possible to prove that j would never be able to
increase its proﬁts through some randomization strategy.
This game exhibits inﬁnitely many equilibria, including the frictionless assignment.2 All
jobs oﬀer all workers their wage in the competitive equilibrium, and each worker looks for
a diﬀerent job, with the same assignment as in the decentralized equilibrium. This type
of equilibrium is unappealing, since it requires that identical workers know exactly how to
sort themselves across jobs. I preclude this possibility by focusing on symmetric subgame
perfect equilibria: ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers and ranking rules depend only on the workers’ human
capital, and in every subgame, workers with the same level of human capital use the same
payoﬀ-maximizing application strategies. Since the frictionless assignment requires that
identical workers apply for diﬀerent jobs, it is ruled out by the symmetry restriction. There
is experimental evidence supporting the symmetry assumption in markets with a small ﬁnite
number of traders (Ochs 1990), and it seems even more plausible in large labor markets.
3.4 Coordination Friction
The restriction to symmetric equilibria introduces a coordination friction into the model
(Montgomery 1991, Peters 1991, Burdett, Shi, and Wright 2001). Suppose that x workers
each apply to a job with independent probability q/x. The job expects to get q applications,









x−z. For large x, this is well-approximated by a Poisson
distribution, i.e. the probability the job gets exactly z ∈ {0,1,2,...} applications is
qze−q
z! .
Moreover, this result does not depend on the assumption that all the applicants apply for
the job with the same probability. This means that there are two ways for a job to be sure
to get an applicant: either inﬁnitely many workers must apply for the job with positive
probability, so the expected number of applicants is inﬁnite; or some type hn worker must
apply for the job with probability 1. But the symmetry restriction implies that if one type
hn worker applies for the job with probability 1, then so must all the others. Either way, the
2For details in a related model, see Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001).
8expected number of applicants must be inﬁnite, which is generally not optimal, since only
one applicant can get the job.
Let q(hn,j) denote the expected number of type hn workers applying to job j, hereafter
referred to as job j’s queue length. This will be a key variable in the analysis of equilibrium.
With a ﬁnite queue length q(hn,j), n = 1,...,N, a job with k units of physical capital is ﬁlled
by a type hn worker with probability e−
PN
m=1 R(hm,hn,j)q(hm,j)(1−e−q(hn,j)), the product of the
probability that the ﬁrm does not receive an application from a higher ranked worker and the
probability that it receives at least one application from a type hn worker. Conversely, if a




the ratio of the probability that the job hires a type hn worker and the expected number of
type hn applicants.3
4 A Single Firm’s Behavior
The ﬁrst and lengthiest step in analyzing the equilibrium of this economy is a partial equi-
librium analysis of a single ﬁrm’s behavior. Firm j sets a wage w(hn,j) for each type of
worker hn, taking as given the wages set by the other ﬁrms. The promised wages determine
the queue of workers {q(hn,j)} through their application decisions. A ﬁrm that oﬀers higher
wages will obtain longer queues, since workers will accept lower employment probabilities in
return. In what follows, I show that one can think of the ﬁrm choosing queues directly, and
then back out the implied choice of wages.
4.1 Proﬁt Function





, and the resulting revenue in the event it does
3More formally, the probability that exactly z other type hn workers and no better workers apply for





z! , in which case the worker is hired with probability 1
z+1.




















m=1 R(hm,hn,j)q(hm,j)1 − e−q(hn,j)
q(hn,j)
.









(f(hn,kj) − w(hn,j)). (1)
The ﬁrm sets wages recognizing that these will determine the expected queue of workers. To
understand the precise relationship between these variables, I turn to workers’ payoﬀs.
4.2 Utility Function
The expected utility of a type hn worker, v(hn), is equal to the highest utility she can get
by applying for some job j, the product of the promised wage w(hn,j) and the probability




behavior by type hn workers implies that they only apply for job j, q(hn,j) > 0, if it oﬀers




m=1 R(hm,hn,j)q(hm,j)1 − e−q(hn,j)
q(hn,j)
w(hn,j).
If the right hand side is smaller than the left hand side, type hn workers would rather apply
for a diﬀerent job, and so q(hn,j) = 0. If it is larger, q(hn,j) will increase until the expected








for all q(hn,j) ≥ 0. A single ﬁrm takes workers’ utility v(hn) as given, so it views equation (2)
for each n = 1,...,N as summarizing the wage-queue tradeoﬀ.
4.3 Eliminate Wages
The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts (1) taking the wage-queue tradeoﬀ (2) as given for each type
of worker hn. It is easiest to solve this problem by substituting the N constraints into the













10The ﬁrst term in the sum is the probability that the ﬁrm hires a type hn worker to ﬁll the
job times the resulting revenue, while the second term is the expected cost of attracting
an applicant queue of q(hn,k) type hn workers. Viewed this way, the job has a particular
production function translating expected applications into expected revenue, and the ﬁrm
faces a competitive market for applicants with v(hn) representing the linear cost of type hn
applications. This is very nearly a textbook proﬁt maximization problem.
4.4 Ranking, Part I
The only odd feature of ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function (3) is the ranking function R. Although this
must be consistent with hiring the most proﬁtable applicant whenever a choice is available,
it will simplify the analysis if I temporarily ignore that constraint. Instead, at this point I
simply ask what ranking function maximizes proﬁts as written in equation (3). It is easy to
conﬁrm algebraically that revenue maximization dictates that ﬁrms always hire the most pro-
ductive applicant.4 Intuitively, the ranking function aﬀects the expected revenue generated
by queue lengths {q(hn,j)}. Revenue maximization dictates making the most productive use
of a given pool of applicants by always hiring the most productive one. However, the rank-
ing function does not aﬀect the expected cost of attaining those queues,
PN
n=1 q(hn,j)v(hn),
since lower ranked workers must be compensated for a low hiring probability with higher
wages when they are hired. The expected cost of a type hn applicant is v(hn), regardless of
the hiring probability.
With this motivation, I will temporarily assume that ﬁrms hire the most productive
applicant, R(hm,hn,j) = 1 if and only if m > n. I return to this issue in Section 4.9,
conﬁrming that optimizing ﬁrms set wages consistent with this ranking rule.
4Suppose there is an hn > hm with R(hn,hl,j) = R(hm,hl,j) for all l / ∈ {n,m}, and R(hn,hm,j) = 0.








which is positive since f(hn,kj) > f(hm,kj). Thus consecutively ranked types must be ordered according
to productivity, and so by extension must everyone else.
114.5 Existence of a Solution to the Firm’s Problem
















m=1 R(hm,hn,j)q(hm,j) is the expected queue of
more productive workers applying for the job. Assuming v(hn) > 0 for all n, Weierstrass’s
theorem ensures the existence of a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem. Obviously the ﬁrm must
choose q(hn,j) ≥ 0. If I also introduce an additional constraint q(hn,j) ≤
f(hn,kj)
v(hn) for
all n, then the ﬁrm maximizes a continuous function on a compact set, and a solution
to the maximization problem exists. But this last artiﬁcial constraint is innocuous. The
terms m = n + 1,...,N in the proﬁt function (4) are unaﬀected by q(hn,j), while terms
m = 1,...,n − 1 are decreasing in q(hn,j). Only term m = n is possibly increasing in
q(hn,j). It is equal to zero if q(hm,j) = 0, and is negative for all q(hn,j) ≥
f(hn,kj)
v(hn) . A
proﬁt maximizing choice of q(hn,j) cannot exceed this bound. The artiﬁcial constraint is
therefore not binding, and the existence result carries over to a ﬁrm that is allowed to choose
q(hn,j) larger than
f(hn,kj)
v(hn) . On the other hand, if v(hn) ≤ 0, there is no solution to the ﬁrm’s
problem, since it would desire an arbitrarily long queue of these workers. In the remainder of
this section, I restrict attention to v(hn) > 0, and in Section 5 conﬁrm that any equilibrium
has this property.
4.6 Uniqueness of the Solution to the Firm’s Problem
To prove uniqueness of the solution, I show that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function (4) is globally






















12In particular, the Hessian matrix of the proﬁt function can be expressed as the sum of N
symmetric N ×N matrices, where matrix l ∈ {1,...,N} has a zero entry in element {m,n}




Pre- and post- multiplying each of these matrices by a non-zero vector (v1,...,vN) yields
a nonpositive number, and a strictly negative number for matrix 1. Summing across these












proving the Hessian is negative deﬁnite and the proﬁt function is globally concave in q.
Uniqueness ensures that any two ﬁrms with the same level of physical capital will choose
the same queue lengths. With a slight abuse of notation, let q(hn,k) denote the expected
number of type hn applicants for any job with k units of physical capital, and Q(hn,k) denote
the expected queue of more productive applicants.
4.7 First Order Conditions
Since the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is globally concave, the standard ﬁrst order
condition is therefore both necessary and suﬃcient for proﬁt maximization. The condition
states that the derivative of the proﬁt function with respect to q(hn,j), given in expres-
sion (5), must equal zero when q(hn,j) is in the interior of the constraint set, but can be









and q(hn,k) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
A ﬁrm with k units of physical capital attracts applications from type hn workers up to
the point where the expected marginal cost of an application v(hn) is equal to the expected
marginal revenue generated by the application, given by the right hand side of the inequality.
If n = 1, condition (6) states that the marginal revenue is equal to the product of the
probability that the ﬁrm receives no applications, e−Q(h0,k), and the revenue produced by
a type h1 worker f(h1,k) (since f(h0,k) ≡ 0 by construction). More generally, marginal
revenue is determined by the increment in production compared to what the ﬁrm could have
13produced by hiring a less productive applicant. For example, if n = 2, marginal revenue is
equal to the product of the probability the ﬁrm does not get an application from a type h2 or
better worker, e−Q(h1,k), times the output produced by a type h2 worker in excess of what a
type h1 worker would produce, f(h2,k)−f(h1,k); plus the probability that the ﬁrm does not
get any applications, e−Q(h0,k), times the output produced by a type h1 worker f(h1,k). Put
diﬀerently, expected marginal revenue is equal to the probability the ﬁrm hires the worker
times the output the worker produces if hired, minus the output that the ﬁrm can expect to
get from the next best applicant, whose quality and presence is a random variable.
4.8 Wages
I now step back and use the ﬁrst order condition for the choice of queues to back out the











where with another slight abuse of notation, w(hn,k) denotes the wage oﬀered to type hn
workers by any ﬁrm with k units of physical capital. If q(hn,k) = 0, a ﬁrm with k units of
physical capital can oﬀer this wage without attracting applicants from type hn workers, but
the model does not pin down the wage uniquely. For example, a zero wage oﬀer would do
the same trick.
The ﬁrst term in the wage oﬀer represents the probability that the job receives exactly
one type hn application conditional on receiving at least one such application, the ratio of the
probability of receiving exactly one type hn application, q(hn,k)e−q(hn,k), to the probability
of receiving at least one type hn application, 1 − e−q(hn,k). If the job receives an identical
application, then the marginal product of the application from the type hn worker is zero.
Otherwise, the marginal product is the probability that the next best application is a type
hj < hn application, multiplied by the diﬀerence in productivity between those workers. This
is given by the sum in (7). In words, a worker gets a wage equal to the output she produces
in excess of the expected amount that the next best applicant would have produced. This
is exactly what the ﬁrm would pay to guarantee receiving an application from the worker,
reﬂecting the competitive nature of the decentralized equilibrium.5
5It is also equal to the expected wage that the worker would earn if the ﬁrm used a sealed-bid second-
price auction to sell the job to one of the applicants (Julien, Kennes, and King 2000, Shimer 1999). This
14The wage does not depend on the expected number of applications from, or the pro-
ductivity of, workers with more human capital. This is because a type hn worker is only
hired, and the wage w(hn,k) is only paid, when no worker hm, m > n, applies for the job.
In this event, those issues are immaterial. This highlights an interesting dichotomy in the
assignment model with coordination frictions: unemployment is determined by competition
from more productive workers, while wages are pinned down by expected competition from
less productive workers.
4.9 Ranking, Part II
I can now conﬁrm that ﬁrms want to hire the most productive job applicant, f(hn,k) −
w(hn,k) > f(hm,k) − w(hm,k) whenever n > m. The intuition for this result is quite
simple: ex ante, a ﬁrm earns higher proﬁts when it hires a more productive worker, and so
it would like to rank more productive workers ahead of less productive ones. By doing so,
workers anticipate that the ﬁrm will hire more productive workers more frequently, and so
such workers will still apply for the job at a relatively low wage. Ex post, the low wage
reaﬃrms the ﬁrm’s preference for hiring more productive workers.
Lemma 1. f(hn,k) − w(hn,k) > f(hm,k) − w(hm,k) whenever n > m and q(hn,k) and
q(hm,k) are positive, so ﬁrms always hire the most productive job applicant.
Proof. Take any hm > hb with q(hn,k) > 0, q(hm,k) > 0 and q(hz,k) = 0 for all hn <
hz < hm.
q(hn,k)
1−e−q(hn,k) > 1, since this is the inverse of the probability that a type hn worker is

















Similarly, q(hm,k) > 0 implies
q(hm,k)e−q(hm,k)
1−e−q(hm,k) < 1, since this is the probability that the job
receives no identical applications conditional on hiring a type hm worker. Thus equation (7)
suggests that existing results on the equivalence between auctions and ex ante wage commitments (e.g.










Subtracting the ﬁrst inequality from the second gives


















Further simplify this using the assumption that q(hz,k) = 0 for all hn < hz < hm, or
equivalently Q(hz,k) = Q(hn,k) for all hn ≤ hz < hm. All the exponents in the ﬁrst sum
are zero, while the second line is zero since Q(hn,k) = Q(hm−1,k):






= f(hm,k) − f(hn,k),
as desired. Extends this using transitivity to arbitrary positive q(hm,k) and q(hn,k).
4.10 Summary of a Single Firm’s Behavior
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1. A ﬁrm with k units of physical capital takes the vector of worker’s utility
{v(hn)} as given and chooses the vector of queue lengths {q(hn,k)} ≥ 0 to maximize prof-
its (4). Queue lengths satisfy the complementary slackness condition (6) and are uniquely
deﬁned if {v(hn)} is strictly positive. The ﬁrm obtains this queue by oﬀering a wage sched-
ule (7). The ﬁrm always hires the most productive applicant for the job.
5 Equilibrium
Section 4 looked at a single ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem, taking the vector of worker’s
utility {v(hn)} as given. When the economy is in equilibrium, however, {v(hn)} is determined
endogenously. The notion of labor market equilibrium is standard. For any ‘prices’ {v(hn)},
calculate the demand for each type of labor by each type of ﬁrm, {q(hn,k)}, uniquely deﬁned
by the complementary slackness condition (6). Sum across ﬁrms to get the total demand for
16type hn labor, θ
R ¯ k
0 q(hn,k)dΦ(k). The labor market is in equilibrium if the demand for each





where q(hn,k) is consistent with the ﬁrst order condition (6).
5.1 Existence
The ﬁrst step in establishing the existence of an equilibrium is proving that v(hi) is bounded
above zero. Fix any capital stock k > 0 with Φ(k) < 1. Then sum the resource constraint (8)





and so in particular there must be some k ∈ [k,¯ k] with Q(h0,k) ≤ 1
θ(1−Φ(k)). Also, condi-




where the second inequality uses Q(h0,k) ≤ 1
θ(1−Φ(k)) and f(hn,k) ≥ f(hn,k). This provides
a strictly positive lower bound on the equilibrium value v(hn). It is also possible to ﬁnd an
upper bound on the equilibrium value of v(hn). If v(hn) ≥ f(hn,¯ k), condition (6) implies
q(hn,k) = 0 for all k ∈ [0,¯ k], inconsistent with equilibrium.
Next, for any positive value of the vector {v(hn)}, let {q(hn,k)} denote the proﬁt maxi-
mizing queue lengths of each ﬁrm k, uniquely deﬁned by Proposition 1. Using these, deﬁne
the excess demand for type hn workers by Xn ≡ θ
R ¯ k
0 q(hn,k)dΦ(k) − ψn. Now consider
the operator Tn that updates v(hn) to v(hn) + Xn, truncated at [v(hn),f(hn,¯ k)]. That
is, if v(hn) + Xn > f(hn,¯ k), the new value of v(hn) is f(hn,¯ k). If v(hn) + Xn < v(hn),
the new value of v(hn) is v(hn). Otherwise the new value is v(hn) + Xn. Let T ≡
T1 × ··· × TN denote the associated composite mapping. T is continuous since {q(hn,k)}
is continuous in {v(hn)} by Berge’s (1963) Theorem of the Maximum. Moreover, T maps
[v(h1),f(h1,¯ k)] × [v(hN),f(hN,¯ k)] into itself by construction. Brouwer’s theorem therefore
ensures that the mapping has a ﬁxed point.
17All that remains is to prove that a ﬁxed point is an equilibrium price vector. First suppose
there is a ﬁxed point with v(hn) = f(hn,¯ k) for some hn. This implies q(hn,k) = 0 for all k,
so Xn = −ψn. The updating rule then yields a new value of v(hn) < f(hn,¯ k), contradicting
the assumption that this is a ﬁxed point. Alternatively, suppose there is a ﬁxed point with
v(hn) = v(hn) for some hn. By construction, at this low value of v(hn), there must be excess
demand for some type of worker, say hm ≥ hn with Xm > 0. The only way that the updating
rule would not increase v(hm) is if it is already equal to f(hm,¯ k), a possibility already ruled
out. This means that at any ﬁxed point, v(hn) ∈ (v(hn),f(hn,¯ k)) for all hn. Such interior
values are ﬁxed points only if there is no excess demand, Xn = 0, completing the proof.
5.2 Uniqueness and Eﬃciency
Rather than prove uniqueness of the decentralized equilibrium directly, it is easier to analyze
a related centralized problem. Consider a hypothetical social planner who selects q(hn,k) ≥ 0
for all ﬁrms k given the resource constraint (8). Assume the social planner is constrained by
the same symmetry restriction as the decentralized economy, and so cannot direct identical











Express the planner’s output maximization problem as a Lagrangian with multiplier
v(hn)
θ

















Although here v(hn) represents a shadow wage, a comparison with (4) establishes that the
social planner eﬀectively maximizes the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts with a given shadow wage
v(hn). The Kuhn-Tucker theorem then ensures that any decentralized equilibrium solves the
planner’s problem, maximizing output. Finally, the proof that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is
concave in q carries over to the centralized problem as well. There is at most one solution
to the planner’s problem,6 hence a unique decentralized equilibrium. In summary:
6A technical caveat is in order here. The social planner can behave suboptimally on a set of measure zero
k without lowering output, yielding a trivial multiplicity of solutions to the planner’s problem. Nevertheless,
v(hn) is pinned down uniquely by the social planner’s problem.
18Proposition 2. There exists a unique decentralized equilibrium in this economy. The equi-
librium maximizes the value of output subject to the coordination friction.
This result contrasts sharply with results in random search models with heterogeneous agents.
Sattinger (1995) and Burdett and Coles (1997) establish the existence of multiple equilibria.
Shimer and Smith (2001a) show that none of the equilibria decentralize the social optimum,
with some agents too willing to accept matches and others too reluctant. Acemoglu (1996)
and Davis (2001) focus on another ineﬃciency: workers and ﬁrms generally underinvest in
human and physical capital in random search environments.
5.3 Mismatch
Workers can segregate themselves, for example with more productive workers always applying
for more productive jobs, but in equilibrium they choose not to do so. As long as there are
at least two types of workers, it is possible to ﬁnd an interval of physical capital levels
that receive applications from both types of workers. If the physical capital distribution
has convex support, this interval will include a positive measure of ﬁrms. And within that
group of ﬁrms, in any realization of the mixed strategies, it is possible to ﬁnd both a more
productive ﬁrm that hires a less productive worker and a more productive ﬁrm that hires a
more productive worker, relative to the two less productive ﬁrms. I refer to this phenomenon
as mismatch, since any physical capital to human capital matching pattern is possible.
Proposition 3. Assume N ≥ 2 and the support of the physical capital distribution is convex.
A positive measure of jobs receive applications from at least two types of workers, generating
mismatch.
Proof. First, suppose a type k job optimally receives no applications, q(h,k) = 0 for all h.
Condition (6) simpliﬁes to v(hn) ≥ f(hn,k), so the cost of an application from a type hn
worker is higher than the amount she produces, even if she is hired with probability one
whenever she applies for the job. Monotonicity of f ensures that this must also be true
for all less productive jobs k0 < k. In other words, there is a threshold k < ¯ k such that
workers only apply for jobs above the threshold, and all jobs above the threshold receive
some applications.
Next, if all jobs only received applications from one type of worker, it is possible to
partition the jobs k ≥ k into those jobs that receive applications from type hn workers,
n = 1,...,N. By deﬁnition, the partition consists of nonintersecting sets, each with positive
19measure and with union [k,¯ k]. Not all of these sets can be closed, so there must be points
k ∈ (k,¯ k) such that k is in one element of the partitions, say the set of jobs that receive
applications from type h workers, but is a limit point of another set. In other words, it
is possible to ﬁnd a sequence {kz} converging to k, with q(h,kz) = 0, but q(h,k) > 0, so
q(h,·) is discountinuous at k. However, Berge’s (1963) Theorem of the Maximum implies
q(h,·) is continuous in k, since the proﬁt maximization problem is continuous in k and has
exactly one solution. This is a contradiction, which implies that there are some jobs that
receive applications from two types of workers, q(hm,k) > 0 and q(hn,k) > 0 for m 6= n.
Continuity of q ensures these inequalities hold for nearby k. If the support of the physical
capital distribution is convex, this region must include a positive measure of jobs k.
This Proposition depends on the assumption that the production function is strictly
increasing.7 Consider the Leontief production function f(h,k) = minhh,ki. Assume that the
human capital and physical capital distributions are identical, although the ﬁrm-worker ratio
θ need not be equal to one. I claim that in equilibrium, queue lengths satisfy q(hn,hn) = θ−1
and q(hn,k) = 0 otherwise, while v(hn) = e−1/θhn. It is easy to verify that this satisﬁes
the resource constraint (8). Also, since Q(hn−1,k) = θ−1 if k ≥ hn and zero otherwise,
condition (6) reduces to e−1/θhn ≥ e−1/θ minhhn,ki for k = h1,...hN. This is always satisﬁed,
and it holds as an equality for k ≥ hn, and in particular whenever q(hn,k) > 0. Now
consider the limit as the number of human capital levels goes to inﬁnity, and the human and
physical capital distributions converge to any atomless limit Φ. The basic characterization
of equilibrium holds in this limiting economy as well, and in particular, no ﬁrm receives
applications from more than one type of worker.
5.4 Empirical Predictions
According to the textbook assignment model (Sattinger 1993), a worker’s wage should be
determined by her characteristics, not by her job. However, econometricians usually ﬁnd
that in a regression of wages on a worker’s characteristics, much of the residual can be
explained through the characteristics of her job (Krueger and Summers 1988, Groshen 1991,
Gibbons and Katz 1992, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). One possible explanation is
unobserved worker heterogeneity (Murphy and Topel 1987). Since more productive workers
7If output were not strictly increasing, aggregate output would not be a strictly concave function of the
queues, and so the social optimum need not be uniquely deﬁned. It follows that multiple equilibria can exist.
The Theorem of the Maximum still applies, but it only tells us that the set of proﬁt maximizing queues is
upper hemicontinuous in k. This eliminates a crucial piece used in the proof of Proposition 3.
20get better jobs, the job reveals something about the worker’s productivity that is observable
to ﬁrms but unobservable to the econometrician. But that does not seem to be the whole
story. For example, Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1992) ﬁnd that
workers who move from a high to a low wage ﬁrm lose approximately the wage diﬀerential
between the two ﬁrms. Another explanation is that workers in some industries receive a
compensating diﬀerential. Again, this explanation appears to be incomplete, since Krueger
and Summers (1988) ﬁnd that industry ﬁxed eﬀects have little explanatory power. Most
wage dispersion appears to be at the level of individual ﬁrms.
This paper provides a concise explanation that is consistent with this evidence. A single
type of worker typically opts to search over a range of diﬀerent types of jobs. A worker who
earns a high wage relative to her characteristics opted to seek a high wage, high productivity
job, and was lucky enough to ﬁnd one. The presence of ﬁrm eﬀects in a wage regression is
thus a classic sample selection problem: the econometrician does not observe the workers
who seek but fail to ﬁnd high wage jobs.
The key to this explanation is that more productive jobs pay higher wages. This is true if
the production function is supermodular: for all h2 > h1 and k2 > k1, f(h2,k2)+f(h1,k1) >
f(h2,k1)+f(h1,k2). Of course, supermodularity is also implicitly assumed in the unobserved
heterogeneity explanation, since this restriction ensures that more productive workers are
assigned to better jobs in a frictionless environment.
Proposition 4. Assume f is strictly supermodular. Then Q(h,k) is strictly increasing in
k whenever it is positive and w(h,k) is increasing in k whenever q(h,k) is positive. Thus
there is a positive correlation between a worker’s wage w(h,k) and the quality of her job k
after conditioning on worker characteristics h.
Proof. The bulk of the proof consists of showing that Q is increasing in k. Recall that
Q(hN,k) = 0 by construction. Now, to ﬁnd a contradiction, suppose there exists an n < N
and a k < k0 with Q(hn,k) > 0 and Q(hn,k) ≥ Q(hn,k0). Since Q(hn,k) > 0, it is possible
to ﬁnd an n0 ≥ n+1 with Q(hn,k) = Q(hn0−1,k) > Q(hn0,k), i.e. the least productive worker
who is more productive than hn and whom k attracts with positive probability. Since Q is
nonincreasing in h, Q(hn,k0) ≥ Q(hn0−1,k0), and so by transitivity, Q(hn0−1,k) ≥ Q(hn0−1,k0)
as well.
Since k attracts hn0 but k0 does not necessarily do so, (6) binds in the ﬁrst case but not

















Strict supermodularity implies f(hm,k)−f(hm−1,k) < f(hm,k0)−f(hm−1,k0) for all m since




m=1 e−Q(hm−1,k0). This precludes the pos-
sibility of Q(hm−1,k) ≥ Q(hm−1,k0) for all m = 1,··· ,n0. Pick the largest n00 ∈ {1,...,n0}
with Q(hn00−1,k) < Q(hn00−1,k0). Since by construction Q(hn0−1,k) ≥ Q(hn0−1,k0), in fact
n00 ∈ {1,...,n0 − 1}. Note that if n0 = 1, there is no such n00, ﬁnishing the proof.
Once again, monotonicity of Q ensures that Q(hn00,k) ≤ Q(hn00−1,k), and since by con-
struction Q(hn00,k0) ≤ Q(hn00,k), transitivity implies Q(hn00,k0) < Q(hn00−1,k0) ≡ Q(hn00,k0)+
q(hn00,k0), i.e. q(hn00,k0) > 0, so k0 attracts applications from type hn00 workers. Again appeal
































However, by construction Q(hm−1,k) ≥ Q(hm−1,k0) and so e−Q(hm−1,k) ≤ e−Q(hm−1,k0) for m ∈
{n00+1,...n0}, while supermodularity implies f(hm,k)−f(hm−1,k) < f(hm,k0)−f(hm−1,k0)
for these m as well. This clearly contradicts the ﬁnal inequality, proving that Q(hn,k) is
increasing in k when it is positive.
To prove w(hn,k) is also increasing in k, recall that the probability hn is hired by k when








where the second expression uses q(hn,k) = Q(hn−1,k)−Q(hn,k) to obtain a more convenient
expression. Simple diﬀerentiation shows that the hiring probability is decreasing both in
Q(hn,k) and in Q(hn−1,k), and thus decreasing in k. Since hn is less likely to get hired
22in jobs with higher k, equation (2) implies that she must be compensated with a higher
wage.
An additional implication of Proposition 4 is that more productive ﬁrms attract more
applicants, Q(h0,k) is increasing in k. This is consistent with the observation by Holzer,
Katz, and Krueger (1991) that high wage ﬁrms attract signiﬁcantly more applicants.
It is not necessarily true that more productive workers get higher wages at a given job,
w(h,k) need not be increasing in h. A slightly less productive worker may be much less likely
to be hired, in which case ﬁrms may compensate her with a much higher wage. In Section 6, I
construct an example in which wages depend on physical capital k but not on human capital
h. By perturbing the example, one can therefore get either correlation between wages and
human capital after conditioning on physical capital.
A related implication of the model is that after conditioning on ﬁrm characteristics,
establishments that hire workers with better observable characteristics should earn higher
proﬁts. This follows trivially from Lemma 1, and requires only monotonicity of the produc-
tion function. I restate the result for expositional purposes:
Proposition 5. f(h,k)−w(h,k) is increasing in h whenever q(h,k) is positive. Thus there
is a positive correlation between a ﬁrm’s proﬁt f(h,k)−w(h,k) and the quality of its employee
h after conditioning on ﬁrm characteristics k.
The correlation between a ﬁrm’s proﬁt f(h,k)−w(h,k) and the quality of its worker h after
conditioning on ﬁrm’s characteristic k reﬂects that some ﬁrms potentially get applications
from multiple types of workers, and that some of these ﬁrms are luckier than others, hiring
workers with more human capital and earning higher proﬁts. There is less evidence in sup-
port of this Proposition, since an empirical investigation must utilize a matched worker-ﬁrm
data set to measure both ﬁrm proﬁts and worker characteristics. To my knowledge, the only
direct test of this hypothesis is contained in recent work by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margo-
lis (1999) using French data. Table X on page 298 shows that a ﬁrm’s proﬁts, measured
as the ratio of operating income divided by capital stock, is increasing in its workers’ ob-
servable characteristics (‘Average Predicted Eﬀect of x Variables (xβ)’). Moreover, Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis follow workers over time, and so include individual ﬁxed eﬀects in
their regression to control for unobserved heterogeneity. They ﬁnd that workers’ unobserved
characteristics have a small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts. An impor-
tant caveats in interpreting these results is that my model does not capture the institutional
23structure of the French labor market, e.g. high minimum wage levels and centralized bar-
gaining. Nonetheless, existing empirical evidence on the correlation between ﬁrm proﬁts and
worker characteristics is consistent with the model.
A random search model with heterogeneous agents also delivers within group wage and
proﬁt inequality, since some agents are luckier than others. However, neither Proposition 4
nor Proposition 5 holds in such a model, at least if wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
Shimer and Smith (2000) show that with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution production
function with elasticity of substitution less than or equal to 1, the surplus that a worker
gets is a continuous single-peaked function of the characteristics of the job, increasing in k
at low values but typically obtaining an interior maximum and then decreasing for higher
values of k. Thus there is no reason to expect any particular correlation between wages and
physical capital after conditioning on human capital. The same is true for ﬁrms: proﬁts are
decreasing in the worker’s human capital for high values of h because the negotiated wage
is very high, and so there is no obvious correlation between proﬁts and human capital after
conditioning on physical capital. Any empirical evidence in support of these Propositions
favors the assignment model with search frictions in preference to the random search model.
6 Cobb-Douglas Production Function
In this section, I analyze a special case in considerable detail, providing closed-form solutions
that help to make the analysis more concrete. I assume that the production function is Cobb-
Douglas, f(h,k) = Ahαkβ, with positive parameters A, α, and β, and that the distribution
of physical capital is Φ(k) = kγ on [0,1] for some γ > 0. Imposing restrictions on α+β, e.g.
constant returns to scale, is unnecessary.
6.1 Equilibrium
Begin by deﬁning K(h) as the solution to
K(h)
γ − logK(h)
γ ≡ 1 +
γ
βθ
(1 − Ψ(h)), (11)
0 < K(h) < 1, where Ψ(hn) ≡
Pn−1
m=1 ψm denotes the fraction of the labor force with lower
productivity than hn, a cumulative distribution function. K(h) is increasing in Ψ(h), and
so this forms an increasing sequence of numbers, 0 < K(h1) < ···K(hN) < 1. Then I claim

























so Q(hn−1,k) = β log k
K(hn) for k ∈ [K(hn),1] and zero otherwise. In other words, type hn
workers apply for all jobs above the threshold K(hn). They are equally likely to apply for all
jobs above the next threshold K(hn+1), and somewhat less likely to apply for jobs between
K(hn) and K(hn+1).




























= Ψ(hn+1) − Ψ(hn)
where the third expression is derived from the second by integration and the fourth from
the third by substituting for K(hn)γ − logK(hn)γ and K(hn+1)γ − logK(hn+1)γ using the



























which holds as an equality if and only if k ≥ K(hn). This conﬁrms that the prescribed queue
and worker’s value form an equilibrium, and Proposition 2 ensures uniqueness.
Curiously, workers’ application decisions depend only on their percentile in the human
capital distribution, not on the level of their human capital. It makes sense that doubling
each worker’s human capital should not aﬀect application decisions, since that simply raises
output by a factor of 2α, but it is more surprising that nonlinear convolutions of the human
capital distribution also do not aﬀect applications.
No worker applies for a job below the least productive worker h1’s threshold K(h1) > 0,
the solution to K(h1)γ − logK(h1)γ ≡ 1 +
γ
βθ. This means that for any distribution of
human capital, a positive measure of jobs with physical capital 0 < k < K(h1) never get
25any applications. These jobs do not congest the labor market, and the equilibrium would
be unchanged if they did not exist. Nonetheless, their presence is interesting. The jobs
remain vacant with probability one, yet they coexist with unemployment. Any worker could
guarantee herself a job by applying to one of them, but in equilibrium this is not worthwhile.
The worker would rather risk unemployment to get a higher wage at a higher productivity job.
The existence of this fringe of available vacancies suggests a formal deﬁnition of voluntary
unemployment as workers who can get jobs with probability one but choose to enter lengthy
job queues instead. Of course, voluntary unemployment, like all unemployment in this model,
is eﬃcient in the sense that it maximizes aggregate output.
6.2 Continuous-Type Limit
It is easier to characterize the equilibrium if there is a large number of worker types, approx-
imated through a continuous density. Let Ψ(h) denote an atomless cumulative distribution
function, and deﬁne K(h) as in (11). Take an arbitrary sequence of models with a discrete
worker distribution converging to the atomless distribution Ψ(h). Then it is readily veri-
ﬁed that in the continuous-type limit, the density of type h applications to type k ﬁrms,













Also, Q(h,k) = β log k
K(h) if k > K(h) and Q(h,k) = 0 otherwise. Thus type h workers are
equally likely to apply for any job above their threshold K(h), using a uniform distribution
in deciding where to apply.









where h is the lower bound on the human capital distribution. In particular, v0(h) =
Aαhα−1K(h)β, a standard pricing equation in frictionless assignment models (Sattinger
1993), setting the marginal cost of a type h worker equal to the marginal product of the
worker in a job with physical capital K(h). In a standard frictionless assignment model,
K(h) would be the one type of job that h is assigned to in equilibrium. With coordination
frictions, it is the worst type of job that h applies for, or equivalently the job that she is sure
26to get.
The wage equation (7) also simpliﬁes in the limiting economy, since there is no chance
that a ﬁrm receives multiple applications from the same type of worker. Any ﬁrm with
















Because the characterization of the limiting economy is somewhat simpler than the charac-
terization of the economy with a discrete number of worker types, in what follows I focus on
the limiting economy. All the results also carry over to the discrete-type economy.
6.3 Wages and Human Capital
Proposition 4 proves that a worker’s wage is increasing in the physical capital of her job as
long as the production function is supermodular. It need not be the case, however, that a
ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer is increasing in the human capital of its worker, as the following example
illustrates: f(h,k) = Ahk; φ(k) = 1 on [0,1] (so α = β = γ = 1); Ψ(h) = 1+e(h−1)−eh−1
on [1,2]; and θ = e. Then (11) implies K(h) = eh−2 ∈ [e−1,1], while substituting into
equation (12) implies ˜ q(h,k) = 1 if k > K(h) and is zero otherwise. Substituting these results
into equation (13) yields a simple formula for ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers, w(h,k) = Ak, independent
of the worker’s human capital. By perturbing the example, it is easy to construct examples
in which the wage is either increasing or decreasing in h.
This example provides one possible explanation for why many ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers are
not very sensitive to the human capital of their employees. High productivity applicants
are compensated primarily through an increased hiring probability rather than through the
wage. Of course, the example is not generic, and so one would be very surprised if the optimal
wage oﬀer were completely independent of human capital. But the example illustrates that
even in generic environments, ﬁrms may not lose much by oﬀering a single wage. It is easy to
imagine the lost proﬁts being made up by not having to verify the worker’s human capital.
6.4 Employment Rates
More productive workers are employed more often. The ﬁnding might not seem surprising,
since they are at the front of job queues, but there is an eﬀect working in the opposite
direction. Less productive workers apply for some jobs that more productive ones pass over.
27To prove this result, I calculate the employment rate directly. A type h worker is equally
likely to apply for any job above her threshold k > K(h), facing an employment rate of
e−Q(h,k) = (K(h)/k)β in such a job. This implies that on average she is employed with




1 − K(h)γ =
γ(K(h)β − K(h)γ)
(γ − β)(1 − K(h)γ)
or
−K(h)β logK(h)β
1−K(h) if γ = β. This is increasing in K(h), hence increasing in h. For the
highest type, K(h) = emp(h) = 1, so she is always employed. Such a worker never ﬁnds
herself behind another on a job queue. On the other hand, the unemployment rate of the
least productive worker may be very high. In the example from the previous section with
α = β = γ = 1, Ψ(h) = 1 + e(h − 1) − eh−1 on [1,2], and θ = e, emp(h) = 2−h
e2−h−1, so
emp(0) ≈ 0.58. That is, the least productive worker is unemployed approximately 42%
of the time.8 By applying for a job at or below her threshold K(0) = e−1, she would be
guaranteed employment, and would be able to produce a positive amount of output.
6.5 Weak Assortative Matching
Consider an econometrician who has access to a data set containing a matched sample of
workers and jobs. An observation consists of the human capital of an employed worker h,
drawn randomly from the employed population, and the physical capital of her job k. Ac-
cording to the frictionless assignment model, if the production function is supermodular, the
nth most productive worker in the data set should be employed in the nth most productive
job. In other words, the rank correlation coeﬃcient should be equal to one. This result does
not generalize to the assignment model with coordination frictions since there is mismatch.
Nevertheless, I show in this section that with a Cobb-Douglas matching function, more pro-
ductive workers generally obtain more productive jobs and more productive ﬁrms generally
hire more productive workers. In particular,the rank correlation coeﬃcient is positive, a
notion that I call ‘weak assortative matching’.
A type h worker is equally likely to apply for any job above her threshold K(h), but,
conditional on applying for it, she obtains a type k ≥ K(h) job with probability e−Q(h,k) =
(K(h)/k)β, decreasing in k. This means that the physical capital of worker h’s employer
8Since this is a one-shot game, unemployment rates are very high. With additional employment oppor-
tunities in future periods, the rates would naturally come down.
28is a random variable with cumulative distribution
kγ−β−K(h)γ−β
1−K(h)γ−β for k > K(h), and limit
1 −
logk
logK(h) when γ = β. The distribution of jobs for more productive workers ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates the distribution for less productive workers.
A similar argument establishes that the distribution of worker characteristics at a ﬁrm
with k units of physical capital and an employee is a random variable with distribution
K(h)β−K(0)β
kβ−K(0)β . This is decreasing in k, so more productive ﬁrms hire more productive workers
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
In principle, it is possible to test for ﬁrst order stochastic dominance using nonparameteric
techniques in a suﬃciently large data set. In practice, however, the data demands may be
unrealistic. Thus it is useful to understand some weaker and more easily testable implications
of the assignment model with coordination frictions. First order stochastic dominance implies
that the observed mean level of physical capital conditional on a worker’s human capital,
E(k|h), should be increasing in the worker’s human capital. Likewise, the expected rank
order of the job’s physical capital within the data set of ﬁlled jobs, ˜ Φ(k), should be increasing
in the rank order of the worker’s human capital, ˜ Ψ(h). Conversely, E(h|k) and E(˜ Ψ(h)|˜ Φ(k))
should be increasing in k and ˜ Φ(k), respectively.
A much weaker prediction is that the correlation and the rank correlation between












(h − h0)(E(k|h) − E(k))

> 0
where h0 is deﬁned by E(k|h0) ≡ E(k). The ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of covariance,
the second uses the law of iterated expectations, E(hE(k|h)) = E(hk), and the third uses
the fact that both E(h) and h0 are numbers, and so the product of either constant with
E(E(k|h)−E(k)) is zero. The inequality then follows immediately from the deﬁnition of h0
and the assumed monotonicity of E(k|h). For h > h0, E(k|h) > E(k), and so the product
inside the inequality is positive. It is also positive for h < h0, since then E(k|h) < E(k).
Finally, correlation and covariance always share the same sign, since their ratio is the product
of the standard deviations of h and k. A similar proof works for rank correlations.
Finally, but more hypothetically, suppose an econometrician had access to a data set
consisting of an unemployed worker’s human capital and the physical capital of a job that
she applies for. The model also yields ﬁrst order stochastic dominance relationships for this
29type of data. More productive workers apply for more productive jobs, and more productive
ﬁrms get applications from more productive workers. Hence weak assortative matching
carries over to such a data set.
6.6 Comparative Statics
The model is suﬃciently tractable so as to be amenable to comparative statics. Consider an
increase in workers’ human capital, represented by an decrease in Ψ(h) for all h. This reduces
the threshold K(h) for all h, so a worker whose human capital is unchanged applies for less
productive jobs on average, is unemployed more frequently, and earns a lower expected
income v(h).
Of course, the increase in skills is likely to induce a shift in ﬁrm’s physical capital in the
long run, and so it is natural to also consider the eﬀect of an increase in γ.9 This raises
K(h) for all h, so workers seek jobs with more physical capital, as one might expect. Since
the expected income of a type h worker is K(h), it follows that expected income rises as
well. Finally, K(h)γ, the percentile of a type h worker’s minimally acceptable job, falls. This
means there is less competition for the top jobs, reducing the unemployment rate. In other
words, the endogenous response of the physical capital distribution to an increase in workers’
human capital is likely to oﬀset much of the eﬀects discussed in the previous paragraph
7 Two Types of Workers
This section focuses on generalizing the assortative matching results to other production
functions. Unfortunately, I am unable to provide a useful characterization of matching pat-
terns with arbitrary production functions and an arbitrary number of worker types. I instead
assume that there are only two types of workers, N = 2. I show that whether matching is
assortative depends on whether the production function f(h,k) is log supermodular.10
9Studying the equilibrium response of ﬁrms’ investment to shifts in the human capital distribution goes
beyond the scope of this model. See Shi (2001b) for a related model with endogenous physical capital choice.
10Together with the standard assumptions that f is nonnegative and increasing, log supermodularity
implies supermodularity. For example, within the class of Constant Elasticity of Substitution production
functions, log supermodularity imposes that the elasticity of substitution between human and physical capital
is less than unity, its value in the Cobb-Douglas case.
307.1 Log-Supermodular Production Function
Assume that the production function is log supermodular. Rather than providing a closed
form solution, I focus on how equilibrium queue lengths depend on the endogenous price of
applications v(h1) and v(h2). My analysis imposes only a very weak equilibrium condition
on the model, that some type of ﬁrm k must be willing to hire type h1 workers. Deﬁne three





f(h1,kc). Note that the right hand side of each deﬁnition is increasing in
k since f is monotonic, supermodular, and log supermodular. Thus there is at most one
solution to each equation. For now assume that a solution exists to each equation. Then I
claim that in equilibrium ka < kb < kc, and queue lengths are given by
q(h1,k) =

     





















0 k ≤ kb
log(f(h2,k) − f(h1,k)) − log(v(h2) − v(h1)) if k ∈ (kb,kc]
logf(h2,k) − logv(h2) k > kc
(15)
I prove this result in steps. First, observe that ka R kb ⇐⇒ kb R kc: ka > kb implies





f(h1,kb). Log supermodularity of f implies
f(h2,k)
f(h1,k) is increasing in k,
and hence that kb > kc. The proofs with ka = kb and ka < kb are identical.
I next prove that ka < kb < kc in any equilibrium. There must be some k with q(h1,k) >
0. If also q(h2,k) > 0, (6) implies
v(h1) = e
−(q(h1,k)+q(h2,k))f(h1,k) and v(h2) = e
−q(h2,k)(f(h2,k) − f(h1,k)) + v(h1).
Since e−q(h1,k) < 1, the ﬁrst equality implies v(h1) < e−q(h2,k)f(h1,k). Use the second




f(h1,k) or k < kc. Also, since e−q(h2,k) < 1, the second
equality implies v(h2) − v(h1) < f(h2,k) − f(h1,k) or k > kb. That is, if q(h1,k) > 0 and
31q(h2,k) > 0, ka < kb < k < kc. Alternatively, if q(h2,k) = 0, (6) implies
v(h1) = e
−q(h1,k)f(h1,k) and v(h2) ≥ f(h2,k) − f(h1,k) + v(h1).
Since e−q(h1,k) < 1, the equality implies v(h1) < f(h1,k) or k > ka. The inequality directly
implies k ≤ kb. That is, if q(h1,k) > 0 and q(h2,k) = 0, ka < k ≤ kb < kc. Either way,
ka < kb < kc.
Next consider what happens if q(h1,k) = 0. If q(h2,k) > 0, (6) implies
v(h1) ≥ e
−q(h2,k)f(h1,k) and v(h2) = e
−q(h2,k)f(h2,k).




f(h1,k), so k ≥ kc in this case. On
the other hand, if q(h2,k) = 0, (6) implies
v(h1) ≥ f(h1,k) and v(h2) ≥ f(h2,k).
The ﬁrst inequality implies k ≤ ka.
Finally, I can use these same results to solve explicitly for q(h1,k) and q(h2,k). For
example, suppose q(h1,k) > 0 and q(h2,k) = 0 so ka < k ≤ kb. Then solve v(h1) =
e−q(h1,k)f(h1,k) for q(h1,k) to get the expression in the statement of the proof. The other
cases are identical.
If one or more of the points ka, kb, or kc is not deﬁned, the appropriate region of the
parameter space disappears. Consider the Constant Elasticity of Substitution production
function f(h,k) =
 
αhρ + (1 − α)kρ1/ρ with elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ less than one, or









h1, there is no value of k such that q(h2,k) > 0 and q(h1,k) = 0. Eﬀectively,
kc = ∞, so q(h1,k) > 0 for all k > ka. The same result carries over to the Cobb-Douglas
case, and so in fact the analysis in this section requires only weak log supermodularity of
the production function.11
Using the expressions for q(h1,k) and q(h2,k) in equations (14) and (15), it is easy
to prove that assortative matching carries over to this environment, with more productive
11There are also values of v(hi) such that v(h2) − v(h1) > f(h2,k) − f(h1,k) for all k, since the latter is
bound above by α1/ρ(h2 − h1). This would appear to imply kb = ∞ as well, but that is not quite correct.
For a type k ﬁrm to hire a type h2 worker, it must be the case that v(h2)−v(h1) < f(h2,k)−f(h1,k), and
so a global failure of this inequality is inconsistent with any ﬁrm hiring a type h2 worker, hence inconsistent
with equilibrium.
32workers generally obtaining more productive jobs. The distributions of a type h1 and a type





















respectively. The numerator on the left hand side integrates the probability that a type
l ﬁrm hires a type h1 worker, e−q(h2,l) 
1 − e−q(h1,l)
, multiplied by the density of type l
ﬁrms, over all ﬁrm types below k. This is converted to a distribution by an appropriate
denominator. The right hand side performs a similar calculation for the type h2 ﬁrms. To
see why the inequality holds, observe that the integrand in the numerator of the left hand
side is increasing for l ∈ (ka,kb), since q(h1,l) is increasing and q(h2,l) = 0; it is decreasing
for l ∈ (kb,kc), since q(h1,l) is decreasing and q(h2,l) is increasing; and otherwise it is equal
to zero. The integrand in the numerator of the right hand side is increasing for l > kb and
is otherwise equal to zero. This yields a single crossing property of the densities, which in
turn ensures ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of the distributions. Similarly, more productive
ﬁrms are relatively more likely to hire a type h2 worker than a type h1 worker.
7.2 Additively Separable Production Function
The assumption that the production function is log supermodular is crucial to this assor-
tative matching result. Suppose f(h,k) = αh + βk, the limit of Constant Elasticity of
Substitution production functions as the elasticity of substitution goes to inﬁnity, and a log
submodular production function. The characterization of equilibrium qualitatively changes.

























0 k ≤ ka
log(αh2 + βk) − logv(h2) if k ∈ (ka,kb]
log(α(h2 − h1)) − log(v(h2) − v(h1)) k > kb
33Curiously, there is no region of the parameter space with q(h1,k) > 0 and q(h2,k) = 0. To
see why, note ﬁrst that Proposition 3 ensures that there must be mismatch, some k with
both q(h1,k) > 0 and q(h2,k) > 0. For such a k, condition (6) implies v(h2) − v(h1) =
e−q(h2,k)α(h2 − h1). This provides a restriction
v(h2) − v(h1) < α(h2 − h1) (16)
that is independent of k, and so must be satisﬁed in any equilibrium. But now note that if
ever q(h1,k) > 0 and q(h2,k) = 0, (6) implies v(h2)−v(h1) ≥ α(h2−h1), which is impossible.





since the right hand side is decreasing in k. Combining this with v(h2) ≡ αh2 + βka yields
v(h2)−v(h1) ≥ α(h2−h1), a contradiction. The remainder of the proof follows the structure
of the argument for the log supermodular case, and so is omitted.
Low productivity workers only apply to high productivity ﬁrms, k > ¯ k, and with queue
lengths increasing in the ﬁrms’ productivity. High productivity workers also apply for lower
productivity ﬁrms, with an increasing queue length for k ∈ (k,¯ k), and thereafter a constant
queue length. This reverses the structure of applications in the log supermodular case. On
average, more productive ﬁrms hire less productive workers, negatively assortative matching.
The intuition for this result follows from thinking about the output-maximizing assign-
ment of workers to jobs, which is the same as the equilibrium assignment (Proposition 2).
High productivity workers should be spread across as many jobs as possible, so as to ensure
that they are employed. However, there is no sense in sending a low productivity worker to
a low productivity job, since little output is gained. Rather, low productivity workers should
queue at high productivity jobs, making sure that these ﬁrms hire someone. This carries over
to nearby supermodular but log submodular production functions, e.g. Constant Elasticity
of Substitution functions with a high elasticity of substitution between human and physical
capital.
8 Conclusion
The assignment model with coordination frictions explains a rich set of interactions between
heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms. It is also tractable, particularly in some special cases,
such as the Cobb-Douglas. It should therefore lend itself to a number of extensions. In
concluding, I will mention only three.
34First, as noted in the comparative statics exercises with the Cobb-Douglas production
function, there are some questions that are most naturally asked in a model with endogenous
physical capital investments. The close link between the equilibrium of this model and the
competitive equilibrium of the market for job applicants, as well as earlier work by Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) and Shi (2001a), suggest that some of the results, for example eﬃciency
of the decentralized equilibrium, are robust to this extension.
Second, I have assumed that workers can only apply for one job. There are conceptual
diﬃculties in allowing workers to apply for multiple jobs simultaneously: can ﬁrms make
‘second-round’ oﬀers in the event their ﬁrst oﬀer is turned down? Albrecht, Gautier, and
Vroman (2001) analyze a version of this model with homogeneous workers and ﬁrms, showing
that the basic properties of the model carry over to an environment with second round oﬀers.
Third, the model should be extended to a dynamic framework if it is to be taken quan-
titatively seriously. The extension should also have some qualitative eﬀects on the results.
For example, I showed that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the most productive
ﬁrms attract applications from all workers. In a dynamic model, these ﬁrms would refuse
to hire very unproductive workers, and so low productivity workers would not apply for the
job. This would likely strengthen the assortative matching results discussed in Sections 6
and 7.
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